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ABSTRACT 
Related to growing concerns about food safety, the present heterogeneity of 
certifications and types of control adopted in international supply chains has been 
interacting with a number of private level strategies, having supermarket chains and 
large distributors as main protagonists, such as the strategic selection of target market or 
the differentiation strategy of B2B ('Business to Business') and B2C ('Business to 
Consumer'), which are applicable to food safety in the fresh fruit and vegetable 
distribution channel. 
In this paper, on the one hand, we describe the types of international supply chains for 
fresh products, and on the other hand, the strategies related to food safety of importers 
and distributors in developed countries. This with the aim of determining how these 
strategies influence and interact with both the health risk and the management and 
decision processes along the supply chain. Especially, it is shown how the diversity of 
effects caused by the introduction and development of risk management systems is 
reflected in the wide range of inter-related responses performed by the different 
members of the distribution channel. This paper proposes a summary of the more 
noteworthy ones in a segmented way according to their strategic purposes. 
As main conclusions of this paper we have that, due to the need and obligation for the 
distribution channel´s members to meet the quality and safety levels required by the 
market, the characteristics of the linkages, which were established until now along the 
supply chain, have been altered towards a search for higher upstream commitments 
from retailers to producers, and thus, the operator´s response to the new dimension 
acquired by food safety within the supply chain has led to the staging of new methods 
and procedures for its management. It can also be observed that the bulk of the literature 
in the area of food safety in the fresh fruit and vegetables supply chain is about the 
government and implementation of quality in products, processes, or with specific 
protocols, being much less present a pragmatic and management approach oriented to 
executive staff in their various areas of responsibility, as well as empirical fieldworks. 
 
Keywords: food safety, international supply chain, strategies, management, fruit and 
vegetables. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Growing concerns about Food Safety in the European context have been raising the 
need for public and private coordinated policies and a homogenization of such policies 
in national and international distribution chains. In particular, the increase in food 
products transactions, such as fruit and vegetables from Mediterranean countries in 
recent years, is implying higher requirements on the internal organization of the chain 
and the development of the free market competition. 
In the above framework, the project SAFEMD (no. 219262 FP7- ERANET ARIMNet), 
within the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union, includes the objective to 
determine the characteristics of the relationships among food supply chain´s actors from 
States belonging to the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, with 
reference to three countries of the European continent, France, Italy and Spain, and 
three north African countries, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. 
Thus, it is considered of interest a deeper investigation of two basic aspects: 
i) To analyze the operations of the supply chain, especially for fruit and vegetables, to 
develop policies that ensure the health of consumers, both buyers of imported products 
and consumers of these products within the borders of the producing country. 
ii) To determine the potential entry barrier that food security strategies applied along the 
distribution channel may cause for exporters from less developed countries, taking into 
account the development path that primary sector exports represent to these countries. 
Following the same line, as a result of the emerged debate on the unfair competition 
among chain members on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, it is also of interest to 
identify the existence or not of sanitary dumping within the sales operations of the 
different stakeholders towards the European market, which could be based, where 
appropriate, by the disparity of the different national regulations in this area. 
The effects caused within the distribution channel as a result of health alerts and non-
compliance with quality standards are equally relevant in this work. Similarly, it is very 
important to study the internal functioning of the supply chain as well as vertical 
coordination relations between industry actors, in particular, those interactions resulting 
from strategies implemented by these operators to avoid the negative consequences of 
such incidents. 
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Thus, this deliverable, in accordance with the task 2.1. of Work Package 2 (WP2), aims 
to review the literature on the state of knowledge about the topics of interest discussed 
above. Furthermore, the purpose of this task is to provide the project with a broad view 
of the state of affairs, in the geographic area of reference, as a basis for the subsequent 
execution of activities, especially the Work Package 2 and, more broadly, for all other 
Work Packages and field studies (e.g. operator surveys), and, ultimately, for the analysis 
of data and drawing conclusions. 
On the one hand, we describe the types of international supply chains for fresh products, 
and on the other hand, the strategies related to food safety of importers and distributors 
in developed countries. This with the aim of determining how these strategies influence 
and interact with both the health risk and the management and decision processes along 
the supply chain. Especially, it is shown how the diversity of effects caused by the 
introduction and development of risk management systems is reflected in the wide 
range of inter-related responses performed by the different members of the distribution 
channel. This paper proposes a summary of the more noteworthy ones in a segmented 
way according to their strategic purposes. Specifically, those implemented: 
a) For the management of health risks; 
b) Faced with the effects of the regulatory framework; 
c) As management of communication and labeling strategies towards the consumers; 
d) To develop and evaluate food safety controls; 
e) By retailers; 
f) With effects in exporting developing countries; 
g) Because of the incentives to adopt quality standards. 
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As main conclusions of this paper we have: 
- Due to the need and obligation for the distribution channel´s members to meet the 
quality and safety levels required by the market, the characteristics of the linkages, 
which were established until now along the supply chain, have been altered towards a 
search for higher upstream commitments from retailers to producers. These 
commitments are being instrumented by the adoption of protocols and quality standards 
beyond the Legislation (mainly developed and required by these same retailers), which 
has become de facto a technical and commercial entry barrier for third countries. 
- The operator´s response to the new dimension acquired by Food Safety within the 
supply chain has led to the staging of new methods and procedures for its management. 
- The bulk of the literature in the area of Food Safety in the fresh fruit and vegetables 
supply chain is about the government and implementation of quality in products, 
processes, or with specific protocols, being much less present a pragmatic and 
managment approach oriented to executive staff in their various areas of responsibility, 
as well as empirical fieldworks. 
In general, it is observed that existing studies on the subject show that the adoption of 
Food Safety protocols are in many cases linked to strategic management decisions, such 
as consumer appeal, export to developed countries´ markets or adaptation to the 
regulatory framework. However, there is a gap in the research on the connection 
between these strategies and financial aspects of the companies, operations of vertical 
integration or customer service. Similarly, there are few applied studies and scarce 
verification of the different theories on Food Safety, including dumping in international 
trade, in the different sectoral and geographical areas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 This report corresponds to the technical memory to be presented within the 
realizable 2.1 activity of the SAFEMED (no. 219262 FP7-ERANET ARIMNET). This 
project, under the Framework Program of the European Union, aims to analyze the 
conditions for an international food safety co-regulation between the North and South 
shores of the Mediterranean Sea. As key elements considered are the study of the 
structure of competition between supply chains of both parts and the exam of the 
possibilities of a public and private coordination of food safety strategies. For this 
purpose, the project develops a multidisciplinary analysis that makes possible reconcile 
the following aspects: 1) the imperative of food safety to ensure the European 
consumers health by safe imports, and, at the same time, the health of southern 
Mediterranean consumers that must be benefited from the development of good 
agricultural practices internationally; 2) the access to the market for producers in the 
South countries, given that agricultural exports are an important factor for their 
economic development, 3) fair and safe competition among players in the North and 
South to avoid dumping phenomena by quality derived of the heterogeneity of the 
international food safety regulations.  
 Food safety is considered a public good in the sense that an underestimation of 
this policy can cause important damages for all parties (companies and consumers) and 
not only to those directly responsible for the incident. The project is designed to 
emphasize the particular characteristics of the economies in both sides of the 
Mediterranean, having into consideration three European countries (Spain, France and 
Italy) and three from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia).  
 Particularly, it recognizes an important role to marketing and intermediary links, 
as well as to the public sector, focusing on empirical studies on the distribution channels 
for fresh fruits and vegetables. Added value distribution between intermediaries located 
in importing countries and local interest groups is taken into account as an indicator of 
the equity in North/South trade relations. To obtain the results, we will follow a 
methodology of surveys and personal interviews with the different members of the 
channel and it will be created a database for analysis. More specifically, the information 
collected will refer to: production systems, cost of investments in quality and food 
safety, both specific and imposed by importers and retailers, and consumers’ perception 
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and behaviour data facing health concerns based on the information available at the 
moment of the purchase. 
 
2. WP2 GENERAL OBJECTIVES 
 The study of this research group shall delve into the organization of the 
international supply chains. Especially, big importers and retailers will be analyzed, 
with emphasis on their strategic actions, given that they have a remarkable relevance 
and influence within the channel and, in particular, on the development and 
implementation of quality and food safety regulations. The area of influence of such 
players under examination is the geographic context which the countries involved in the 
SAFEMED project (France, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) make up, to 
determine to what extent the above players determine the characteristics of the 
commercial fruit and vegetable channel and even the members that comprise it. All that 
referred to the regulatory framework and quality and safety standards of the products 
that they offer.  
 
3. TASK 2.1 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
 The work of this first phase focuses on the literature review, with two basic 
objectives:   
a) Drawing conclusions about the functioning of international supply chains, 
with influence in the relevant geographic area above mentioned. Particularly 
on the types of organization as well as general strategies supermarket chains 
and food safety importers, reflected in the studies conducted so far on this 
line. 
b) Setting the analytical framework that provides guidance for the development 
of the next WP2 phases. In particular, the detection of existing gaps, key 
contributions of the study, survey approach and orientation of the subsequent 
statistical and econometric analysis.  
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The work carried out is presented subdivided into two sections: 
 General backgrounds and determination of the essential contributions of the 
study. 
 Review of the international chain configuration and implications of 
participating agents. 
 
 
 
4. TASK 2.1. GENERAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE STUDY 
 In the last years, both the growing concern about the risks related to food safety 
in the European context, and the increase of the heterogeneity on certifications and 
types of control adopted in international supply chains, have been the subject of 
numerous reports and research (for example, Willems et. al., 2005, Lee, 2005; Havinga, 
2006; Grazia and Hammoudi, 2012, among others). In particular, the present 
heterogeneity has been interacting with a number of private level strategies, having 
supermarket chains and large distributors as main protagonists, such as the strategic 
option selection of market choice or the strategy differentiation of B2B ('Business to 
Business') and B2C ('Business to Consumer'), which are applicable to food safety in the 
fresh fruit and vegetable distribution channel. 
 This review consists of three sections, the first two focused on the organization 
of the supply chain and the strategies of the different players in relation to food safety 
and quality, particularly with reference to fresh food and fruits and vegetables. The third 
part consists of the limitations and conclusions on the interaction between the two 
previous issues and their implications in determining health risks and organizational 
structures of the supply chain. 
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5. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES OF FRESH FOOD 
SUPPLY 
Table 1 - Summary of contributions on the F&H organization of international supply structures  
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Boehlje, M., 
Akridge, J., Downey, 
D. (1995) 
General Descriptive 
Enumeration of 10 changes with 
implications for the structure and 
performance of agribusiness. 
Zuubier (1999) 
France, USA 
and Holland 
Empirical 
Factors with influence on vertical 
coordination in the fresh produce 
industry. 
Codron, J.M., 
Giraud-Heraud, E., 
Soler, L.G. (2005) 
France Empirical 
- Economic analysis of organization of 
food distribution channel. 
- Selection of public and private 
standards. 
Henson, S., Reardon, 
T. (2005) 
General Descriptive 
- Development and implications of 
private standards. 
- Implications for national and 
international food policy. 
Willems, S., Roth, 
E., van Roekel, J. 
(2005) 
General Descriptive 
Study on the costs of compliance with 
quality standards for exporting 
developing countries. 
Kalaitzis, P., Van 
Dik, G., Baourakis, 
G. (2007) 
UE Members 
and southern 
Mediterranean 
countries 
Descriptive 
- Description of key trends in the F&V 
channel in Europe. 
- Structural elements in the channel of 
F&V in Morocco, Egypt, Israel and 
Turkey. 
Lessassy (2007) France Empirical 
- Impact of vertical coordination in the 
customer-supplier relationship. 
- Limits to duration of conflicts with 
producers for the sale price. 
García, R., Pérez 
Mesa, J.C. (2010) 
Almería and 
its import 
countries. 
Descriptive 
Study of the role of large retailers in 
driving the implementation of biological 
control in production. 
Lee, J., Gereffi, G., 
Beauvais, J. (2010) 
General Descriptive Description of the relationship between 
value chain structure and food safety. 
Moati, P. (2010) France Descriptive 
Description and justification of the 
process of private distributor label 
penetration and its reversibility. 
  
11 
Tozanli, S., El 
Hadad-Gauthier, F. 
(2010) 
UE Members 
and southern 
Mediterranean 
countries. 
Descriptive Structure and classification of global 
value chains. 
Ahn, J., Khandelwal, 
A., Wei, SJ., (2011) 
China Theoretical 
- Reasons for exporting firms to use 
intermediaries. 
- Description of the intermediated market 
characteristics. 
Gereffi, G. (2011) 
China, 
Mexico, USA 
Descriptive Market shares transfer between countries 
within global value chains. 
Hamminaz, R. 
(2012) 
Morocco Descriptive 
Adaptation measures for Moroccan local 
food companies to demands of modern 
distribution channels. 
Latouche, K., 
Rouvière, E. (2012) 
France Empirical Roles and strategies of intermediaries in 
the channel of F&V. 
Pérez Mesa, J.C., 
Galdeano E. (2015)  
Spain Empirical Influence of collaboration in the 
profitable of supply chain 
 
 Globalization has led to a new era characterized by an increased international 
competition whose reflection can be seen in the evolution of the global organization of 
industries and how countries take or lose prominence within them. Global value chains 
show how the new systems of international trade, production and employment give 
shape to the future development and competitiveness by incorporating basic concepts as 
“governance” and “continuous monitoring.” The future of international competition 
shall show the consolidation and adaptation of global value chains and the identification 
of emerging economies to continue their improvement in the value added of the product 
and services within these chains, with an increased focus on domestic and regional 
market (Gereffi, 2011). 
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Figure 1 - Players involved and position in the distribution channel of fruits and vegetables.  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 In the particular case of fruits and vegetables, sales channels are divided into 
two: a traditional channel and a modern one. In the traditional channel producers sell 
their goods to a wholesaler in origin or destination, arriving later to the consumer 
through traditional retailers. The modern system means that the producer sells its goods 
to logistics operators (central or sales platforms) that supply their parent companies: the 
big distribution. Nowadays the modern channel is imposing on the traditional one. 
 The retailer offer of consumer goods is specially concentrated in a few hands. 
This controls the entire supply chain requiring their suppliers some great efforts in 
promotion and quality that detract from the settlements and that therefore, they result in 
the income statement of the weakest link: the primary seller. Fruits and vegetables, as 
poorly differentiated products, are subject, in negotiating with the distribution big 
chains, at a constant downward pressure: large retailers, because of its broad scope, 
have the active or even passive ability to encourage competition among their own 
suppliers, transferring the expertise of the most advanced production areas, always with 
the purpose of getting cheaper supplies (García and Pérez Mesa, 2010). 
 At the same time that globalization and reduction of trade barriers lead to an 
increased international trade in perishable products, the supply chains are increasingly 
more concerned about the safety and quality of their supplies: for them the ability to 
react quickly to the problems will be a source of differentiation. 
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 This way, global value chains should deal with traditional challenges such as 
logistics, flow of payments, packaging and labelling, choice of suppliers, etc., and new 
challenges, by highlighting food safety that influences collaterally on the 
aforementioned ones. 
 Food safety force the members of the supply chain to work together to get a 
transparency within it which ensures the safety of products for consumers. Within the 
different supply chains for fresh fruit and vegetables, the measures implemented in this 
respect differ from each other. According to this differentiation and the level of 
collaboration achieved, Willems et al. (2005) show the following types of channels: 
 Transnational companies that coordinate and control all activities along the 
supply chain ensuring a high quality safe product under their own brand. 
 Producers and companies that work in collaborative supply chains, which are 
helped by buyers in the implementation of private standards and are provided 
with information on food safety requirements in public and private countries of 
consumption. 
 The distribution channels oriented to transaction or controlled by importers, in 
which producers and importers sell their products through intermediaries, being 
so disconnected from the European market. The collaboration in this case is 
limited to each commercial operation, not being these suppliers regularly 
informed of quality and food safety requirements in the consumer countries and 
thereby running the risk of not meeting these requirements. 
 The factor of the vertical coordination in the supply chain takes great relevance 
becoming the identified need that drives these changes and new elements in the 
relations between players in the chain as adaptive measure of sustainability and 
improvement of the functions of the channel, and ultimately, the utility created to the 
consumer. 
 For example, as Hennessy (1996) argues, the effects of information asymmetry, 
given the uncertainty regarding the nature of the quality of the products in the hands of 
suppliers, and the problems to have available such information may be the reasons of 
the development of vertical integration processes in order to meet the new market 
demands. 
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 Nevertheless, other players also influence vertical coordination systems of the 
food industry. Among others, Zuubier (1999) notes that the relating to the specific of 
every type of industry and these based on the company resources would be the most 
prominent, while the differences between product categories and institutional 
environment do not ponder too much on this channel coordination. 
 But we can not forget that its members are after all these actions and strategies 
within the distribution channel. Traditionally, with a basic role, as producers, exporters, 
importers and retailers, but also others, such as dealers, brokers and platforms, whose 
role reveals very important in vertical stress situations in the channel due to information 
asymmetries or elevation of quality and safety demands from customers.  
 Following the direction of the goods through the channel, we find the producer 
as the first link of the chain. He/she, as principal shareholder of the value creation of the 
product in its formation, acquires a fundamental role in the quality and adaptation or not 
to the subsequent health and hygiene requirements imposed by third parties for 
marketing. His/her work in this area is crucial because once the fruit is produced it will 
not be possible any modification or adaptation to any standard or restriction that must 
be overcome. 
 Exporters are the natural next step from the farmer, except for cases of direct 
export and vertically integrated companies, and they may also be producer groups 
involved in the handling or manufacture. 
 The wholesaler at destination is the intermediary nearest to the supermarket 
chain in the natural sense of the supply channel. In many cases, he/she turns out to be 
the interlocutor with the rest of the channel to the producer regarding the 
implementation of the requirements demanded by the supermarket. 
 The retailers’ position (highlighting supermarkets chains), as the last client in the 
supply chain, gives them the power of choice of provider to stock products that they 
will sell then to their customers, consumers, whose loyalty will maintain through prices 
and differentiation policies. These commercial techniques are what mark their strategies 
facing suppliers, imposing them protocols that will maximize this differentiation in 
quality and minimum prices. 
 In the case of intermediaries, their role is to disseminate market information and 
connect buyers with sellers (Latouche and Rouviere, 2012). Although the Internet has 
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drastically reduced the costs of choice, giving consumers the possibility of comparing 
quality and prices, and information being more available than ever, intermediaries 
continue to maintain their activities, particularly in the fresh food market which justifies 
the importance of its adding value. However, the more dynamic and productive local 
businesses are, there are more predisposition to direct export or import. Market 
intermediaries involved in operations of less productive companies while the less 
profitable ones are still in local markets (Ahn et al., 2011). The precise distinction 
between these players (Belleáamme and Peitz, 2010) is that a dealer purchases 
merchandise at wholesale prices for reselling it at a retail price, a platform is a system to 
connect buyers and sellers for a fee, while a broker do not acquire the property of any 
product, but he/she only charges a commission of the total value offering imported 
products at wholesale prices to both retailers and wholesalers. 
 On the other hand, retailers who perform direct import have the particularity to 
purchase products at wholesale prices and sell them at a retail price in their own chain 
of stores. These operators make available to consumers both goods imported by 
themselves and by brokers. 
 Given the progressive weight and power acquired in the last years by retailers 
through, for example, the reduction of their number resulting retailers of a larger 
dimension and market share, and the succession of public health events that have 
changed the perception and involvement of their customers (consumers) about the life 
of the product (from the production stage to retailing) that they purchase, the consumer's 
relationship with the retailer and, therefore, the strength of turnover of this latter one has 
been affected, which has prompted him to impose new strategies within the supply 
channel to increase the quality and food safety guarantees given to consumers, for 
example, by introducing own brands and labelling and certifications of quality. Because 
of this position mainly acquired by retailers over the other members of the distribution 
channel, the authorities have had to punish several companies to reduce the negative 
effects of an excessive domination of distributors over producers. 
 Value creation and the signaling of the generated value through labelling and 
quality certifications involve a closer cooperation between retailers and the other 
players up from the consumer to the producer. According to Codron et al. (2005) we see 
that both retailers and consumers are opting for this type of private labelling versus 
minimum public quality standards that are considered as insufficient. Therefore, 
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through their brands, distributors, looking for reassuring their customers, try to 
communicate the supplementary guarantees which these signs bring. This leads to 
profound changes between distributors and the other agents of the channel, since these 
pass progressively from negotiating the conditions for each purchase transaction with 
their suppliers to agreements determined a priori by specific time periods and they 
incorporate both prices and quality and/or health control certifications, since the image 
of confidence of dealers goes through the mastery of all these aspects of the product. 
 But the implementation and development of the coordination systems necessary 
to achieve the “common” food quality and safety objectives are not exempt of 
difficulties and frictions. Agreements within the supply chain are fragile due, for 
example, to changes in the environment and the simultaneous pursuit of 
competitiveness for all players involved. Learning processes, specialization and 
development of inter-organizational powers are clues that allow us to understand the 
evolution of large retail chains. Regarding large structures such as supply chains, where 
take place disparate strategies and limited resources, the existing imposition of the large 
retail strategies only can be framed as a differentiation factor. In fact, it happens that, for 
example, there is incompatibility between a low prices policy and the pressure coming 
from pre-established agreements with guaranteed minimum price (Lessassy, 2007). 
 This differentiation desired by part of the large distribution finds its main 
support in the labelling of their products with own-brands, which, along with the 
consumer’s increased engagement in the life of the products that they consume, have 
motivated that many dealers start defining their business object not anymore as a purely 
industrial perspective, but within from a more market-oriented one. Although authors 
such as Moati (2010) believe that the concept of own-brands involve a variety of ways, 
they hold a common point: the brand or label adds to the product the support of the 
image of the distributor that, in fact, exploits the marketing monopoly. In addition, it is 
estimated that the rapid penetration of own-brands in the food market, even though it is 
due to current factors, that mainly attests the production of a new market architecture 
accompanied by a redistribution of roles and links in the value chain between the sphere 
of industry and trade, expecting, for that reason, major restructuring within agrifood 
industries (Moati, 2010). The progressive awareness of the structural nature, of the fact 
that own-brands gain importance and the new market architecture that it involved 
emerge, could lead to more radical adaptation strategies that can lead to new business 
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models and to the initiative by the associated producers of not letting more strategic 
components of the value chain in the hands of the distribution. 
 In addition, it should be noted, within the new systems which integrate the 
supply chains, that the phenomenon described concerning white brands has favored the 
emergence of large international groups, little known to the general public, specialized 
in producing on behalf of third parties (Moati, 2010). A number of small and medium 
companies specializing in specific highly differentiated products shall manage to find 
their market in this new context offering to distributor references that will enable them 
to enrich their niche product offer. The main victims of the ongoing evolution are 
medium-scale players whose brands lack the necessary strength to compete with 
distributors’ brands. 
 In this scenario, where new modus operandi are imposed to members of the 
supply channel and costs for compliance are incurred, the operators that result 
especially affected are those located in developing countries seeking to enter markets 
whose distribution channels are under the effect of the imposition of certifications, 
standards and quality standards. That supposes for them necessary organizational 
changes. 
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Figure 2- Detailed diagram of goods, services and information flows in the distribution channel 
of fruits and vegetables (excl. returns).  
 
 
 Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 In the case of the countries involved in the project SAFEMED it is no different. 
Thus, in most of the countries of the southern Mediterranean, the structures of the 
supply channels of fruits and vegetables are in a stage of transfer of government-
controlled institutions to increasing private participation structures. So far, exports are 
being carried out essentially through independent commission agents that operate on 
request and to wholesalers (who serve others wholesalers in importing countries or 
purchasing centers of supermarket chains), as well as other major agents who apply 
modern supply management methods. A high percentage of exports are carried out by 
specialized packer warehousemen. These companies are the best equipped ones to 
properly be part of the great European distribution channels and meet their stringent 
quality protocols as well as their logistics and marketing demands. These large 
exporting companies can address requirements for certification and implementation of 
traceability systems while others of lesser dimension will face increasing difficulties to 
access European supermarket chains that currently impose such requirements (Kalaitzis 
et al., 2007; Hamminaz, 2012). Although most southern Mediterranean countries 
(largely with European funds) have begun to undertake large investments to respond to 
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these restraints, it is unknown to where the additional investment should go due to the 
large structural needs of these areas (number of existing small-scale farms, low training 
and guidance to the domestic market). 
 Thus, local firms increasingly are inserted in supply systems of large distribution 
companies that permanently reconfigure the way they work. These large customers, 
reinforced by his great power within the channel, through the application of their own 
rules and standards have enlarged their area of influence beyond their national borders 
and have emerged as key players in global value chains. A good example is the export 
of Moroccan fresh tomato for the European market, which shows clearly this change in 
the management of local companies matching with a growing role of the European 
agrifood companies. 
 However, taken as a single dimension the increasing governance of global value 
chains by large companies is not sufficient to explain all of the changes in local 
companies that are part of chains (Tozanli and El Hadad-Gauthier, 2010). We should 
also consider that the socio-institutional dimension (institutions and commercial foreign 
policies implemented by the importing country) has an undeniable impact on the 
organization and coordination of local businesses. These local companies as a means to 
get to have greater power of decision and marketing margin, should devote their efforts 
to research and development of new varieties and get partnerships among players in 
origin. 
 Described up to here the situation of the supply channel, we should now ask, to 
what stage are we headed? According to Boehlje et al. (1995) there are important 
changes that are affecting the management of agribusiness companies from 
provisioning, and through operations management, finance, sales and marketing, to 
reach the final consumer as: 
- Globalisation 
- Environmental regulation 
- The size and scope of the company 
- Adaptation and market niches 
- Reduction of agents in the supply chain 
- Phenomena of integration, coordination and investment in social capital 
- Reducing the number of suppliers by customers. 
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- Increased coordination of sales and financial departments 
- Modification of the asset structure 
- Evolution towards transnational companies 
 To give perspective to this review and having into account the importance of the 
influence of the intrinsic effects of food safety within the distribution channel as well as 
an introduction to the later section (on strategies of players in the supply chains of fruits 
and vegetables related to food safety and quality) is important to mention the 
relationship between the structure of the value chain and the quality and food safety 
standards.  
 The increase of private standards has led to a debate as to whether these 
standards act as a entry barrier for small players and prevent poverty reduction in 
developing countries (which has led, for example, to the creation of GAP LOCAL to 
favour that small producers without resources can adhere to good practice protocols), 
because retailers play an essential role in most of the non-traditional agrifood channels. 
Since the impact of private quality standards are often limited to certain specific 
products and areas, the global agreements to regulate agricultural trade at a global level 
should be measures that must be undertaken to protect small players in the global chain 
from the whims of the market and to supplement the private governance schemes (Lee 
et al., 2010). 
 However, despite the growing importance of private governance in the global 
economy, public institutions continue to play a role in agrifood chains. 
 We can conclude this section recapping that even where there are effective 
public food safety standards, the private ones tend to be more demanding in their 
assessment requirements, achieving so a defense system and limiting their exposure to 
penalties by public authorities and consumers. Even though the imposition of these 
standards results effectively an entry barrier for exporting companies in developing 
countries, on the other hand, as we are revealed (Henson and Reardon, 2005), 
transmitting to the consumer in developed countries that private standards go beyond 
public regulation, convinces consumer to buy products from developing countries who 
would otherwise think that they have less control and health quality. This causes a 
major positive impact on the global flows of agrifood products. 
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 Private standards have been established in order to increase profits through 
product differentiation, providing, in this way, incentives to providers to affront 
investment in specific assets as well as to focus to consumer to satisfy the desire of this 
consumer to have a high variety of products that can be purchased in supermarkets or 
traditional distribution channels. 
 All channels, to a greater or lesser extent, use private standards to reduce costs 
and risks in their supply chain. The largest decrease of these costs comes from the 
introduction of standardized processes to coordinate supply systems. 
 The purpose of this review is not to enter deeply into the trends developed in the 
literature referred to food safety in the distribution channels for fresh food (especially 
fruits and vegetables) but to try to reflect a broad perspective including the most 
important of these trends. 
 In the next section, we will go into detail regarding the active part taken by the 
different players in the supply chain in response to the existence of the private quality 
standards of tacit mandatory requirements. 
 
6. PLAYER STRATEGIES OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE SUPPLY CHAINS IN 
RELATION TO FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY. 
 Due to the important changes that are happening on the consumer side and 
within the agrifood industry (Valeeva et al., 2004; Johannessen et al., 2009; Gouin and 
Cordier, 2001; Raspor 2008, among others), new areas and challenges are necessarily 
being faced. In search of the return optimization, sustainability and conflict 
minimization that involve in achieving these challenges, prevailing the quality and food 
safety standards as the main tool, the channel players have had to take on new strategic 
and operational tasks. 
 Within the wide range of possible strategies reactive to the establishment of new 
forms of management and activities that involve the application of standards (mostly 
private) along the agrifood supply chain, in this section we will reflect the most relevant 
and studied ones in the specialized literature. 
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6.1. General strategies for food safety and food risk management  
Table 2 - Summary of contributions with strategies for food safety and food risk management in 
the channel of the F&V.  
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Mitchell, V. W., 
McGoldrick, P. J. 
(1996) 
General Descriptive 
Risk reduction strategies towards 
consumer. 
Ziggers, G. W., 
Trienekens, J. (1999) 
General Descriptive 
Role of vertical coordination arrangements 
within the distribution channel F&V. 
Valeeva, N.I., 
Meuwissen, M.P.M., 
Huirne, R.B.M. 
(2004) 
General Descriptive 
- Description of the Food Safety 
management along the channel F&V. 
- Methods for assessing the benefits of 
improving the Food Safety. 
Gorris, Leon G. M. 
(2005) 
General Descriptive 
Definition of "Food Safety Objective" and 
"Process Objective". 
Starbird, S. A. (2005) General Descriptive 
Contracts design to improve product safety 
in the channel of F&V. 
Starbird, S. A., 
Amanor-Boadu, V. 
(2006) 
General Theoretical Model to determine the expected cost to 
the supplier for food safety incidents. 
Starbird, S. A. (2007) General Theoretical 
Model to determine the relationship 
between the quality and quantity of F&V 
analysis and opportunities to choose 
appropriate suppliers. 
Starbird S. A., 
Amanor-Boadu, V. 
(2007) 
General Theoretical 
Application of principal-agent model to 
the selection of suitable suppliers. 
Houghton, J.R., 
Rowe, G., Frewer, 
L.J., Van Kleef, E., 
Chryssochoidis G., 
Kehagia O., Korzen-
Bohr, S, Lassen J., 
Eastern 
Europe 
Descriptive 
Study of how to manage health risks and 
how well it is done within the channel of 
F&V. 
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Pfenning U., Strada, 
A. (2008) 
Akkerman, R., 
Farahani, P., 
Grunow, M. (2010) 
General Descriptive 
Review of food distribution management 
from the perspective of operations 
management and its relationship with 
industry challenges. 
International 
Commission on 
Microbiological 
Specifications for 
Foods (2010) 
General Descriptive 
Description and application of the "Food 
Safety Objectives" and "Process 
Objectives" in the channel of F&V. 
Giraud E., Grazia, 
C., Hammoudi A. 
(2010) 
Developing 
countries and 
its import 
countries. 
Theoretical 
Development of a model to analyze the 
rationality of the strategic decisions of 
importers considering food safety 
requirements for F&V. 
Banati, D. (2011) 
European 
Union 
Descriptive 
Description of techniques such as "risk 
analysis", "separate estimation of risk" and 
"risk management" to manage consumer 
confidence. 
Dzifa Mensah, L., 
Julien, D. (2011) 
United 
Kingdom 
Empirical 
- Description of the evolution in Food 
Safety regulation. 
- Analysis of the response of 
manufacturers to the regulations based on 
their size. 
 
 First, for asserting how this management is performed, we must consider that 
food risk management (FRM, hereafter) is a complex matter, showing the importance of 
food-related processes in our society. From the consumer perspective, health is not the 
only criterion to judge the quality of the GRA, but other environmental factors as well 
as others of psychological type ones influence too. Fundamentally, each interest group 
has its own perspective of the quality of the FRM and how it could be improved. In 
addition, these different points of view can be addressed. Putting together this spectrum 
of views within a regulation is an arduous task for the public authorities. In parallel, 
there are difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of the FRM practices in different 
dimensions such as the level of protection achieved, transparency and openness to other 
players involved and interests of consumers. The GRA improvement goes through a 
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commitment of public and private players. It has been shown (Houghton et al., 2008) 
that a larger public discussion of the values applied in the FRM can have a positive 
impact on consumer confidence. However, the consultation and involvement of the 
different interest groups in the FRM has negative implications in the decision making 
process being able to slow it down to a larger extent. This last scenario would be unwise 
facing a hypothetical crisis. For this reason among others, incorporating the point of 
view of consumers and other interest points in the GRA or at certain levels of risk 
analysis presents an important challenge, which together with social, ethical and cultural 
aspects can be an impediment to the development of a general approach to the 
framework of food safety policy. Perhaps the response is that the participation of all 
these stakeholders should be assigned to specific issues and, above all, in situations 
where scientific uncertainty is high or where their participation is crucial. However, the 
lack of a concise definition of what represents an “effective” participation of consumers 
in the FRM makes that the benefit-cost ratio of this involvement is not fully described 
(Rowe and Frewer, 2005). 
 It is a confirmed fact that, after the series of food safety scandals of the past 
decade, consumer confidence has been degraded and that both European policy and 
legislation and food safety system have changed accordingly. Despite the fact that food 
has never been more secure, it seems that consumers are now more wary, reagents and 
increasingly critical with the quality of their diets. The introduction of new principles 
such as the framework of risk analysis, the separation of risk assets and the GRA 
provide a more efficient and scientific system to Europe with the ultimate goal to 
recover that lost confidence (Banati, 2011). 
 Thus, Gorris (2005) tells us of how the concept of food safety has been proposed 
as a target for the operational FRM in a flexible way in order that different distribution 
channels and members within those channels can reach equivalent levels of safety. This 
concept serves to better synchronize the GRA with public guidelines on issues such as 
the suitable level of protection. The food safety concept articulates the common goal of 
the supply chain including all their relevant internal links. Objectives and assessment 
criteria have been two new concepts proposed to complement the GRA with systems 
and control measures. This entire framework helps public Authorities to give a 
reference to the distribution channels regarding the minimum expected health while 
serving private players to design their own systems and standards. 
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 The International Commission for Microbiological Specifications for Foods 
(2010) goes further arguing that both the concepts of food safety objectives and 
assessment objectives are added to the already existing programs of good practices 
(GAPs), good hygienic practices (GHPs) and analysis of critical points (HACCP) that 
becomes the means for achieving the security and assessment objectives. The new FRM 
approach provides an operational flexibility which is very important when you have to 
establish the most effective control measures within a given region or operation. The 
current techniques and tools for the GRA have been developed to relate the behavior of 
attributes, or the existence or lack of sampling plans, with the level of danger that could 
be detected with a certain probability (Legan et al., 2001). Many of the food safety 
issues that we face today are complex in nature, often requiring a global approach of the 
chain and multiple simultaneous control measures. According to Stewart et al. (2009), 
the process management based on risk can be still greatly improved through innovation 
in technological processes, mathematical modeling, etc. 
 From the consumer point of view, this whole framework described is 
synthesized in the perception that food will not cause harm when you prepare or eat 
them in a convenient way. Today food safety is managed with a series of good practices 
that are the result of the human lifestyle, history and culture. Raspor (2008) 
distinguishes four dimensions within these good practices: 
 the dimension directly connected to food engineering 
 the one indirectly connected with research and education 
 the one concerning the treatment of foodstuff by the consumer, that is 
disconnected from the supply chain and whose attitude, understanding and 
confidence in it should be increased 
 the focus of the “good nutritional practices,” which include consumers in the 
food safety system through permanent communication, education and 
information exchange 
Under the same principle of inclusion of the figure of the consumer as part of the 
supply chain appears the approach “from the farm to the table” (Valeeva et al., 2004) 
assuming that getting acceptable levels of food safety requires a greater coordination 
and collaboration to shed light on the entire process from producers on. This way, 
obtaining a deeper understanding, in a cost efficient way, of the potential to improve 
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food safety throughout the entire distribution channel as well as a weighting of profits 
for the producer, becomes more important. 
 As part of the FRM we find the response that companies have to give facing the 
food safety regulation. This has materialized through process-based systems and 
integrated approaches (subsequently audited by external certifiers) together with 
performance-based approaches to verify the levels of health dangers.  
 In practice there is a great agreement between public and private regulation, 
which has encouraged companies to implement these FRM systems integrated to 
manage proactively the risks associated with food safety, but complaining that yet the 
legislation has a clear focus on the consumer regardless of the impact on all the interest 
groups within the channel and thus forcing the industry to incur significant costs that 
could otherwise be avoided. However, even though compliance with the law is 
expensive, the economic and opportunity cost of not comply with is conceived even 
higher. Dzifa Mensah and Julien (2011) show that there is not a definite influence of the 
size of the company on the arguments or benefits to comply with food safety regulation, 
being the improvements in safety products, the commercial impact in the market since 
the opportunity cost for the effective implementation of them by the competition are the 
motivations more expected for the implementation of standards. Also, they give the 
keys to adopt and continuously improve FRM systems in companies, having to always 
rely on the efforts of all employees. The various stages of the process must have 
important powers. Companies have three options for development and implementation: 
a) implement the system by themselves; b) through an external consultant; c) a 
combination of both. The biggest handicaps for their implementation are financial, 
infrastructure and personnel. 
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Figure 3 - Challenges, in order of importance, for the implementation of a food risk 
management according to the companies.  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Dzifa Mensah and Julien (2011). 
 
 Other more specific types of response by the channel players to this growing 
attention to food distribution channels are described by Akkerman et al. (2010) leading 
us to more operational areas such as logistics (where the control of the temperature 
variable is essential) and the strategic and tactical design of the chain (which profoundly 
affect product safety, since it determines the number of players and the extent that the 
product must go over). It is remarkable the notion of incompatibility that it gives us 
among values coming from sustainability and food safety, as may be the case of energy 
consumption to maintain low temperatures in the products and the pollution produced 
for it. 
 Illustrating the issue from a more strategic prism Giraud et al. (2010) they carry 
out an analysis of the rationality which bases on the strategic decisions of importers 
about the international agrifood markets in the presence of food safety standards. So, 
they show how these operators adjust their supply volumes to market opportunities. 
These actions have their impact on developing countries, especially as they describe to 
us in the geographical area under study by the SAFEMED Project that can benefit or be 
contrary to their interests. More considerations to the same effect will be discussed in 
the later section on strategies concerning exporting countries. 
 Given the large number of new activities to develop and inter-relationships that 
arise among the channel members to comply in a voluntary or mandatory way with the 
new idiosyncrasies related to food safety, they need elements to sustain and provide 
security to those proceedings. Thus, operators have chosen mostly the contract as the 
tool not only essential but which can be designed to improve the security of supply, 
even in scenarios of asymmetric information. Contracts are also used frequently by 
CHALLENGES RELEVANCE
Resistance to change from employees
Lack of technical knowledge and skills of employees
Lack of knowledge about the requirements
High cost of development and implementation
Inadequate infrastructure  to validate and verify the system
High cost of staff´s training
Lack of culture of responsability
Rapidity of changes in the regulation
Lack of access to necessary and adequate information
Lack of institutional support
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managers to exchange goods, services, information and money among the players of the 
distribution chain (Starbird, 2005). 
 Given this need for information and certainty, from consumers and transmitted 
upward through the players of the chain to producers, becomes a key strategy of choice 
of providers. The diagnostic test gives buyers information on attributes of the reliability, 
such as food safety or the content in genetically-modified organisms. But this causes, 
for example, that mistakes in the testing mislead the purchaser and lead to adverse 
selection problems. The ability to distinguish and separate food suppliers capable of 
delivering safe food on what it does not usually depend at the end of the accuracy of 
these tests. The study conducted by Starbird (2007) tells us about the issue by 
concluding that there is a maximum error level below which uncertain providers are not 
much disposed to create a utility that maximizes the price offered by the buyer. The 
maximum error depends, among other things, on the possibility that the provider’s 
merchandise is not safe and the cost of producing or acquiring an unsafe batch. 
 Understanding this relationship helps managers when designing the contracts 
referred to above, the Administration in its regulatory development and discourages 
unsafe providers. 
 As also Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2007) say, it would be one of the explicit 
objectives of the food safety conditions included in contracts. Thus, the contract is 
increasingly present in the channel, allowing totally let specifications set on product 
attributes, of course, including health. It gives that even being possible to do a contract 
including provisions on traceability and the rest of controls, the motivation to not select 
unsafe providers will depend primarily on the amount of costs in case of incidence and 
on the proportion of these costs which affect the provider. 
 This does not exclude that one of the objectives of traceability is encouraging 
vendors to be safe. Returning to the above matter, the incentive power of these 
techniques goes through the accuracy of inspections, the fact of not passing the 
inspection, the cost of raising an issue and, as already mentioned, the capacity that these 
costs affect the supplier. Studies show that when non-compliance costs may be charged 
to suppliers, the level of control by the buyer becomes minimum Starbird and Amanor-
Badou (2006), although it is given only in this case. 
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 We see how the characteristics specific of production and the market within the 
distribution channels are deep vertical coordination determined by vertical coordination 
in order to gain competitive advantages. We also see that quality systems become a 
backbone channel as synchronizer factor and that the current competitiveness of the 
food supply chain is caused by the capacity of creating successful intra-channel 
relationships. The implications for the distribution channel are the existence of a wide 
variety of business relationships characterized by a high level of commitment and 
confidence, as well as higher entry and exit barriers (Ziggers and Trienkens, 1999). 
 Considering consumers as part increasingly involved in the distribution chain 
and last link of it, this group also has the capacity of employing strategies to reduce the 
risk of their purchase operations (valued in damage to their health). The concept of 
perceived risk is essential to understand the consumer’s buying behavior (Mitchell and 
McGoldrick, 1996). 
 
6.2. Strategic positioning to affront the regulatory framework. 
 
Table 3 - Summary of contributions on the positioning of companies to address the regulatory 
framework in the channel of the F&V. 
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of the 
Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Caswell, J. A., 
Johnson, G. V. 
(1991) 
General Descriptive 
Analysis of the business response to the 
demand for products that guarantee food 
safety. 
Eijlander, P. (2005) Netherlands Descriptive 
Analysis of advantages and 
disadvantages of self and co-regulation in 
Food Safety. 
García Martínez, M., 
Fearne, A., Caswell, 
J., Henson, S. (2007) 
United 
Kingdom 
and USA 
Descriptive Study of the applicability of co-
regulation in the field of Food Safety. 
Johannessen G.S., 
Kofitsyo S. Cudjoe 
(2009) 
Europe Descriptive 
Description of Food Safety regulatory 
framework for F&V in Europe regarding 
microbiological aspects. 
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 Due also to crises and health scares in food (due to chemical agents or 
microbiological contamination), we find in the last years with an increase of the interest 
and regulatory activity of the Administration at all its levels of decentralization. In this 
changing scenario, all members of the distribution channel, to be affected, have had to 
implement strategies to adapt in the most efficient way. In this context, both 
multinationals and local small companies have been involved.  
 The approach of the European Authorities, from the White Paper on Food safety 
(2000), has focused on the development of a European Food Agency, the definition of a 
regulatory framework that covers the whole supply chain and the improvement of the 
control systems (primarily on the borders of the Union) and consumer information 
(Johannesses et al., 2009). More specifically, the channel players are affected becoming, 
expressly, responsible of the safety of the food that they produce, transport, store or sell. 
They must also inform immediately the competent authorities if they have any suspicion 
that their products are not reliable and have the possibility of removing this kind of 
market immediately, being able to identify any provider of their goods at any time. 
They are also required to apply an analysis system of critical and control points, having 
to cooperate with the competent authorities in measures to reduce health risks. 
 This increased regulatory activity has been generated in a parallel way to 
consumer pressure on Public Agencies to be more demanding and proactive. Given the 
limited public sector resources and considering the regulatory impact on the 
competitiveness of companies as well as the scale of implementation of the measures, 
there is a multilateral interest in the hand-in-hand public-private co-regulation to have 
safe food at minimal cost (normative). García Martínez et al. (2007) describe how, 
within this strategy, fit many initiatives such as self-regulation by the industry, two-way 
provision of information, education campaigns, labelling requirements, etc. 
 
 Figure 4 - Level of government intervention for food safety regulation in the fruit and vegetable 
sector.  
 
 
Source: García Martínez et al. (2007). 
INTERVENTION LEVEL APPLIED MEASURES
Non intervention No actions
Selfregulation Voluntary protocols for the production and standards property of retailers
Coregulation Regulation and joint action plans with the sector
Information and education Collection and dissemination of information to consumers
Policy of direct incentives Promotion of private sector actions to invest in food safety
Direct intervetion and control by the Government Regulation, supervision, control and direct sanctions
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 Finding the balance between public and private activity is not easily achieved. 
To do this, a careful cost-benefit analysis of each guideline must be performed. For 
example, the costs to ensure the reliability of food may exceed the benefits to be 
obtained due to the expected increase in retail prices over the utility achieved or 
received by people, causing with it if possible, a grievance to a greater extent to small-
and medium-sized companies. In practice, the impact of regulation varies according to 
the chain link that the company takes up and the products that it sells. 
 The probability of detection and severity of the penalty in case of non-
compliance, give the players along the channel up to the producer, a strong incentive to 
impose control systems and, thus, increase the chances of regulatory compliance. 
Cooperation in the scope of regulation gives rise to various forms of governance such as 
agreements, conventions and even new legislation (Eijlander, 2005). Briefly, the 
measures implemented by private players can be: 
- definition of quality and food safety standards, 
- definition of processes for implementing these standards (more demanding than 
the rules), 
- support and coordination, 
- monitoring, control and execution of corrective measures and market protection. 
 These measures are mainly designed and developed jointly by members of the 
same level in the channel, which directly contributes to reduce costs, among other 
benefits. More generally, we can say that companies actively seek to influence the 
content of the legal rules in pursuit of their interests (Caswell and Johnson, 1991). 
 
  
  
32 
6.3. Strategic management of communication and labelling in order to maintain 
consumer confidence 
Table 4 - Summary of contributions on strategies of communication and labelling in order to 
maintain the consumer confidence in the channel of the F&V. 
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Caswell, J.A., 
Roberts, T., Lin, C.T. 
(1994) 
General Descriptive 
- Description of attributes of Food Safety. 
- Design of vertical control systems and 
consumer communications programs. 
- Economic incentives as a reason of a 
safer food market. 
Roberts, T., Morales, 
R. A., Jordan Lin, 
C.-T., Caswell, J.A., 
Hooker, N.H. (1997) 
General Descriptive 
Description of profit opportunities arising 
from risk reduction associated with food 
safety. 
Caswell, J. (1998) General Descriptive 
Market effects of consumer perceptions 
regarding health´s attributes, of the benefit 
/ cost ratio of labeling to companies and of 
regulatory objectives. 
De Jonge, J, van 
Trijp, J.C.M., van der 
Lans I.A., Renes, 
R.J., Frewer, L.J. 
(2008). 
Holland Empirical 
Relationship between consumer 
confidence in Food Safety and companies 
and institutions. 
Trienekens, J., 
Zuurbier, P. (2008) 
Developing 
countries and 
its import 
countries 
Descriptive Description of the Food Safety situation in 
the food industry. 
Johannessen G.S., 
Kofitsyo S. Cudjoe 
(2009) 
Europe Descriptive 
Description of Food Safety regulatory 
framework for F&V in Europe regarding 
microbiological aspects. 
Grazia, C., 
Hammoudi, A. 
(2012) 
General Descriptive 
- Description of the quality standards 
heterogeneity. 
- Relations between this heterogeneity and 
the structure of global value chains. 
 
 As a group to what, individually, people belong to both members of the fruit and 
vegetable sector and external to it, the consumer, through its buying process, determines 
the price, sustainability or the punishment of a particular company and the strategies 
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that market operators can applied to maximize their share of it. For that reason they find 
crucial their analysis. 
 The food scandals in a number of industrialized countries have heightened 
consumer concerns about food safety and undermined confidence in the existing 
mechanisms for controlling this. At the same time, consumers are paying attention to an 
increasingly broad range of food attributes when assessing the quality of a product, 
basing many of them on experience and confidence. 
 However, given the complexity of the production and supply system, consumers 
must believe in the channel players and the Health Authorities to compensate for their 
lack of information and knowledge (De Jonge et. al., 2008). This confidence is given in 
an active form which, by interacting increasingly citizens with distribution chains, they 
have made that retailers’ quality standards include social, environmental and ethical 
aspects. 
 
Figure 5 – Characteristics according to the order of valuation for consumer in purchasing 
fruits and vegetables in the retail network for the EU27. 
 
Quality & Price dimensions Types of problems experienced with the product Satisfaction with product characteristics
General satisfaction Product quality Comnpetition
Ratio price/quality Prices Assortment
Service quality Service quality Satisfaction
Consumer protection Wrong information Comparability of prices
Payment security Problems with the retailer Confidence
Transparency Cancellation rights problems
Food safety Problems with returns
Comparability of prices Delivery problems
Average price Sales methods
Comparability of quality Product´s safety
Enough range of prices Contracts, terms and conditions
Enough rabge of qualities Warranty problems
Accessibility
Labeling
Environmental friendly products
Innovation
Ethical standards  
Source: European Commission (2009). 
 
 Nowadays, a consumer, before buying, needs to expect that the industry 
provides some social and satisfactory food safety standards. For that reason, end 
customers show that they want to pay a superior price for products that offer them this 
security all year long. Both its health and that of its environment are important 
dimensions for him, wanting to have information on the production processes of the 
type that he/she consumes (Willems et al., 2005). 
 The most effective way to maintain and increase this trust is to provide 
consumer with information on the products. Given the large diversity of all kinds of 
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information related to the product that is generated from production to consumption, the 
label, linked mainly to the packaging, is used as support where the buyer can get, in a 
concentrated way, the knowledge most relevant to him/her (according to the seller), 
associating the values that the label can transmit to a logo, colour or slogan. 
 Producers, handlers, distributors and retailers can use the labelling to emphasize 
the safety of their products voluntarily, by legal action, or by a combination of both 
situations. The effect on the market depends on the perception of each quality attribute 
by the consumer, the benefit and cost of labelling for companies and government policy 
objectives (Caswell, 1998). 
 As we have mentioned, and given the importance of the consumer confidence, 
for its study, this variable may be secreted in the sub dimensions that comprise it like, 
for example, the perceived transparency or the interaction with the channel.  De Jonge et 
al. (2008), through a study of this type, says that a high level of confidence in the 
players in the channel also results in a high level of satisfaction and peace in their 
buying process. In fact, it shows that confidence in the food processing agents has a 
greater influence on consumer purchase intention that the rest of the channel members 
as well as that the “care” put in this work is the most important sub dimension of this 
trust. In addition, his research suggests that to achieve the common goal of maintaining 
a high customer satisfaction with food safety, each channel member should focus its 
efforts on different concrete dimensions of trust within its communication strategies. 
The identification of these attributes allows to design effective communication 
programs for consumers, and to take advantage of large and profitable marketing 
opportunities (Caswell et al., 1994, Robert et al., 1997). 
 In the light of the foregoing, from their design stage, private standards are 
designed to allow companies to take advantage of market opportunities through a 
differentiation of the product based on quality. This function refers especially to the 
standards of individual companies towards the consumer (B2C). Apart from their 
specific objectives, the B2B and B2C approaches differ mainly in their “visibility” vis-
à-vis final consumers. 
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6.4. Strategies to develop and evaluate food safety controls 
 
Table 5 - Summary of contributions on strategies to develop and evaluate food safety controls in 
the channel of F&V. 
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Trienekens, J., 
Zuurbier, P. (2008) 
Developing 
countries and 
its import 
countries 
Descriptive Description of Food Safety situation in 
the food industry. 
Johannessen G.S., 
Kofitsyo S. Cudjoe 
(2009) 
Europe Descriptive 
Description of Food Safety regulatory 
framework for F&V in Europe regarding 
microbiological aspects. 
Grazia, C., 
Hammoudi, A. 
(2012) 
General Descriptive 
- Description of the quality standards 
heterogeneity. 
- Relations between this heterogeneity 
and the structure of global value chains. 
 
 The proliferation of quality standards has caused that exporting companies from 
developing countries encounter problems to comply with these requirements (having to 
have better controls over their production and distribution), causing also a parallel 
increase in marginal costs related to accreditation and certification which affects equally 
to companies in industrialized countries. The combined impact of these effects has 
proved necessary the implementation of strategies to enhance the value of the ratio 
cost/effectiveness of the accreditation and certification systems. 
 
Figure 6- Dimensions of motivation to comply with quality standards, in order of importance, 
according to the companies. 
MOTIVES RELEVANCE
Quality product improvement
Costumer requirement
Legal requirement
Increase of marketing effects
Corporate image improvement
Done by competitors
Claims prevention
Operational costs reduction
Insurance companies requirement
To avoid entry barriers  
Source: Holleran et al. (1999). 
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 Nowadays, the quality assurance systems developed allow the application of 
control and verification measures in order to monitor the quality level along each step of 
the production and trade process both intra and inter-enterprises. Private control systems 
as well as protocols and certification programs no longer are used only in response to 
the highest consumer expectations, but, since the quality related to the product is not 
found anymore, they fit the characteristics of the production and distribution processes 
(Trienekens and Zuubier, 2008, Holleran et al., 1999).  
 Today, the three most important generic quality assurance systems in the food 
industry are the Code of Good Agricultural Practice, the Analysis of Critical Points and 
the standards of the International Standardization Organization. However, within the 
wide range existing, standards can be classified into:  
a) Certification systems for sustainable agriculture, where farmers must generate 
documentation for monitoring and control.  
b) Quality systems based on the sector, usually nationwide.  
c) Quality systems created by the food industry to specify and distinguish 
processes.  
d) Systems developed by retailers focused on a safe and sustainable production.  
e) Regional or traditional quality systems. 
 As for the public sector, the interest has also been directed towards food safety 
controls with special attention to imports at the points of entry to the European Union. 
Each Member State is obligated to make that competent authorities carry out controls at 
an appropriate frequency (and whenever there is a warning) to monitor risk. 
 One of the obligations of operators in the supply channel is to identify and 
regularly review the critical points in their processes and ensure that adequate controls 
are applied at these points.  
 We find specific points regarding the microbiological quality of irrigation water 
and analysis of some stages of the process including worker hygiene in the particular 
assessment criteria for fruits and vegetables (Johannessen et al., 2009). 
 Always, ultimately, if the market does not work “properly” providing sufficient 
incentives for companies to adopt “suitable” food safety measures, or if the economic 
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and social cost of such measures is relatively high according to social benefit in terms of 
increased level on food safety, governments should intervene to make the social level 
optimum for the protection of consumer health (Grazia and Hammoudi, 2012). 
 
6.5. Analysis from the point of view of retailers  
 
Table 6 - Summary of contributions on strategies related to food safety of retailers in the 
channel of F&V. 
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Henson, S., 
Northern, J. (1998) 
United 
Kingdom 
Descriptive Retailers´ response to the distributor 
brands risk. 
Gouin, S., Cordier, J. 
(2001) 
France Empirical 
Retailers´ Food Security strategies. 
Konefal, J., 
Mascarenhas, M., 
Hatanaka, M. (2005) 
General Descriptive Justification of the increase of private 
quality standards in food safety. 
Lee, D.S. (2005) General Descriptive 
Influence of packaging on food safety 
Réviron, S., 
Chappuis, J.M. 
(2005) 
Switzerland Descriptive Analysis of the new food supply chains 
structures. 
Fulponi, L. (2006) 
OECD 
countries 
Descriptive Analysis of reasons that led to retailers 
to the use of private standards. 
Fulponi, L., Giraud-
Héraud, E., 
Hammoudi, H. y 
Valceschini, E. 
(2006) 
General Descriptive 
Impact of private quality standards on 
the economic structure of the agri-food 
supply chain and the improvement of 
Food Safety. 
Havinga, T. (2006) Holland Descriptive 
Study of the effectiveness of the 
protection of public health through 
private quality standards. 
OCDE (2007) General Descriptive 
Analysis and interpretation of trends 
and challenges in the global food 
situation. 
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Garella, P., Petrakis, 
E. (2008) 
General Descriptive Modeling the effects of policies on 
minimum quality standards. 
Hammoudi, A., 
Hoffmann, R., Surry, 
Y. (2009) 
General Descriptive 
Description of the relationships 
between food safety standards, business 
strategies and the organization of the 
supply chain. 
Henson, S., 
Humphrey, J. (2009) 
General Descriptive 
Analysis of how and why the 
emergence of private food safety 
standards. 
PIP (2009) 
East Africa 
and 
Magascar 
Empirical 
Evaluation of compliance status, 
especially with private voluntary 
standards, for access to the export 
markets for the countries in the sample. 
Dzifa Mensah, L., 
Julien, D. (2011) 
United 
Kingdom 
Empirical Study of factors that have impacted the 
food industry settings in the UK. 
Giraud-Héraud, E., 
Hammoudi, A., 
Hoffmann, R., Soler, 
L. G. (2012) 
General Theoretical Study of incentives for retailers to 
accept private safety standards. 
 
 In the current context of overall supply, the European import and distribution 
channels demand private food quality certifications to their providers, both from third 
countries and within the European Union. This requirement is part of a commercial 
agreement that two players accept voluntarily in the market (Lee, 2005).  
 But not only the food industry and producers are the ones that are promoting the 
private standardization in terms of food safety. In fact, in the last years, especially 
retailers have been playing a very active role in the management of quality and safety in 
the supply channel. In particular, large supermarket chains have developed initiatives to 
engage their suppliers in complying with strict protocols. Just a few years ago, security 
was not an important subject for them. Even supermarket chains did not have food 
safety programs or ad hoc technical departments. Nowadays, it has changed. In the 
nineties, some of these chains developed their own exhaustive quality protocols 
including unannounced inspections at production and handling plants. The motivations 
for addressing this regulatory activity were, on one hand, reducing costs per incident, 
and, on the other, transmitting confidence to consumers. However, not all supermarkets 
have developed their own certification system, choosing also to adopt common 
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standards coming from retailer associations. The application of a common private 
standard by a large number of supermarkets maximizes pressure on suppliers (within 
and outside their borders), thus allowing these retailers the choice among numerous 
certified providers, besides boosting consumer confidence in the supermarket (Lee et 
al., 2010). A harmonization of food safety private standards generates benefits for both 
retailers and their suppliers, specifically: legal, technical and financial benefits to 
retailers. However, on the other hand, although a harmonization of private standards a 
priori seems advisable and desirable, this union strikes strategies and power relations of 
each supermarket chain vis-a-vis the others. 
 With strategic perspective, the fact of transferring this pressure to suppliers 
reduces the cost of its implementation at the supermarket itself. However, we must not 
forget that retailers hold simultaneously the legal obligation to take reasonable measures 
and exercise the maximum diligence to avoid quality incidences and health scares, what 
includes the verification of technological processes in the production of food identified 
with their brand. 
 And, since all members of the channel, the retailer is the one that most directly 
supports the responsibility for food safety vis-a-vis the consumers (especially in the 
case of having an own label), they transferred this responsibility to their importers and 
processors through strict quality protocols. This way, in the event that there is a serious 
problem for health risks, both importers and retailers will be affected from any claim, 
even though retailers are not directly related to the problem. All these protocols have 
traceability systems. For example, in the UK, according to the Food Safety Act 1990, 
retailers are required to exercise the “due diligence” to ensure food safety. This 
“diligence” protects consumers and at the same time it protects retailers from being 
convicted in the event of an incidence if they have taken all reasonable precautions to 
avoid the damage (Dzifa Mensah and Julien, 2011). 
 The position of the supermarkets as an end customer in the supply chain, gives 
them the power of choosing a provider to be supplied with products that he/she then will 
sell to its customers, whose loyalty he/she will maintain through pricing policies and 
quality differentiation. These commercial techniques are what mark their strategies vis-
a-vis its suppliers, imposing them protocols that will maximize this differentiation in 
quality and minimum price.  
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 This situation is seen with approval from the Administration because it sees how 
its function of consumer protection and defense is strengthened by the action of private 
players, such as supermarket chains. The application and development of private 
standards, in this case for fresh fruits and vegetables, by retailers, has been imposed in 
all European Union countries, having a very important effect on the rest of the supply 
chain and the European food sector in general. For example, Dutch retailers have 
embraced the BRC protocol developed by British retailers and the German ones have 
created their own protocol (IFS) to what French retailers have subsequently subscribed 
(Havinga, 2006). The role of supermarkets is so important that differences between 
safety and quality standards of different countries / markets are determined primarily by 
private standards imposed by retailers (PIP, 2009). 
 Supermarkets are the link which joins the distribution channel and the end 
consumer. This means that they must attend two interest groups different according to 
the characteristics of each case. To adapt to this, supermarket chains have collective 
private business-to-business standards and individual private business-to-consumer 
standards. Thus, each supermarket establishes its equilibrium between the two types 
giving rise to differentiation strategies based, in greater or lesser extent, on quality 
(Fulponi et al., 2006).  
 In both cases, supermarkets give greater management responsibility to the rest of 
the agents in the channel. However, to produce an effective implementation of a 
collective private standard along the channel, not only this dimension of responsibility 
has to exist in it, a large number of operators that result in a decreased market risk must 
establish a consensus and acceptance of it (Giraud-Héraud et al., 2012). For these 
reasons, and given that the food safety control for fresh products has become a priority 
for retailers, most of them choose to deal with suppliers who follow their production, 
manufacturing and packaging specifications. This practice leads to the setting of long-
term business relationships with a limited number of large distributors, becoming it, in 
some cases, exclusive and being the volume availability, trust and price, the most 
important variables in this relationship. In addition, the retailer is in a position where 
he/she can coordinate its activities to ensure the quality (including in some cases even 
organoleptical properties of the fruits) and health of the products that he/she gets 
through direct investments in the companies of its suppliers and/or visits direct and 
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information exchange. These visits happen to be effective tools for building confidence 
between the two parts (Holleran et al., 1999). 
 Inclusive multinational companies argue that their safety and quality protocols 
go beyond the requirements of the supermarkets themselves, and they are aware that 
their customers buy their products by linking their brand with quality and food safety. 
These companies control the whole chain and, this way, they can offer additional 
guarantees. 
 Due to their particular position and function in the channel, supermarkets require 
flexibility of supply and rigidity in terms of absence of pests and diseases (unlike the 
central wholesale markets), developing traceability systems from the plant to the 
consumer. However, this flexibility is not only unilateral, accepting supermarkets, for 
example, the compliance with EUREPGAP certification held by a distributor in origin 
rather than each individual producer (Willems et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 7 - Benefits of meeting quality standards, in order of importance, according to the 
companies.  
 
BENEFITS RELEVANCE
Customer satisfaction improvement
Internal processes improvement
Increase of quality product
Compliance with regulatory requirements
Corporate image improvement
Staff´s morale improvement
Increased export possibilities
Process costs reduction
Insurance premium reduction  
 
 Source: Adapted from Dzifa Mensah and Julien (2011). 
 
 Since private standards can provide access to competitive advantages (which 
partially explains their origin), they can be exploited by leading companies as a 
competitive repositioning way that can significantly affect competition and vertical 
bargaining power within the supply chains (Grazia and Hammoudi, 2012). The 
possibility of obtaining a higher price, based on consumer willingness to pay for a 
higher level of quality, makes that retailers move beyond public regulations (Garella 
and Petrakis, 2008; Giraud-Héraud et al., 2006) and they differentiate from each other 
on quality issues in order to get a large market share. What has so far been clearly 
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identified is that supermarket chains have continued to increase their interest in learning 
and even control where, how and by whom fresh products which are supplied are 
produced (Konefal et al., 2005). 
 Both retailers and importers make visits to their producer-suppliers in order to 
verify that the quality of their products and processes corresponds to what they demand. 
Thus, in the collaborative channels, each supermarket chain fluidly communicates 
importers and producers of both common and individual standards (example, 
GLOBAL-GAP) that they demand (which in most cases exceeds the public regulations 
and include aspects of corporate social responsibility), as the current health regulation. 
 Similarly, retailers have developed a system of information and early warning 
exchange concerning food safety incidents (Global Food Safety Initiative) which it 
useful for them to inform their suppliers, for example, conflicting producers (Willems et 
al. 2005). 
 In the light of the foregoing, also supermarket chains set their supply and 
positioning strategies based on the quality and safety requirements of each country 
(OECD, 2007). As a result, two predominant forms of private standards driven by 
retailers in agrifood chains have been created:  
a. Collective private business-to-business (B2B) standards as GlobalGap, Safe 
Quality Food, etc., mainly designed to provide the business coordination 
between suppliers to a vertical level;   
b. Standards of individual business-to-consumer (B2C) companies whose 
purpose is the quality differentiation and, therefore, are communicated to 
consumers, such as Field-to-Fork (Marks & Spencer, United Kingdom), 
Nature's Choice/Nurture (Tesco, United Kingdom), EQC-Engagement 
Qualité Carrefour (Carrefour, France), Gold Star (BI-LO, USA), etc.  
 As origin and result of all these changes occurred in the channel we find that the 
supermarket chains have been leaving behind the competition in the market through 
intensive strategies of cost and price reduction to pass to strategies based both on prices 
and product attributes (Konefal et al., 2005). 
 Therefore, nowadays retailers tend to improve their vertical coordination 
contractually. They worry about their own long-term financial health directly 
influencing on the safety of the food they sell. Now, even if this is a widespread 
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practice, it does not implies that all retailers and retailers apply the same strategies and 
marketing activities, these are subordinated to the type of product and brand (Gouin and 
Cordiere, 2001). Therefore, with the proliferation of private standards, many decisions 
regarding public health, food safety and environmental impact risk are daily taken in the 
wings in the global agrifood system. The operation of the new regulatory regime is 
moving progressively from the “front stage” where there is public debate to the “back 
stage” dominated by the large supermarket chains. These chains transnational, 
increasingly, are going to control what crops are produced, where, how and by whom, 
being their decision-making process usually opaque. Konefal et al. (2005) study the 
limitations and long-term effectiveness of a private governance system considering the 
effect that this would have on various political, economic and social aspects such as 
justice, full and fair employment and environmental degradation matters. In addition, 
this governance occurs within a channel that has imperfections such as information 
asymmetries. However, even in the case of products where the risk of getting a faulty 
batch is particularly problematic for retailers, they are not looking for creating, in a 
general way, a system of co-governance directly with producers, a situation that can 
lead to tensions with these ones (Reviron and Chappuis, 2005). The growing voice of 
civil society capable of changing regulatory and institutional frameworks, increasing 
market concentration and buyer power by retailers, as well as their integration in 
financial markets, has been what has led to the development private standards. This 
way, while the quality and safety protocols are considered essential to maintaining the 
reputation and avoid legal liabilities, additional requirements such as working 
conditions, environmental and animal protection are increasing their importance as a 
basis for confidence-building strategies of consumer and market share. The basic 
predisposition on the part of retailers towards harmonization of food safety standards 
appears as an initial step towards a comprehensive approach to the food distribution 
management, with the inclusion and equally harmonization of more standards in the 
future. Given their purchasing power, these movements can be seen as a form of control 
and governance of the alimentary channel (Fulponi, 2006). 
 As we see, it is not hard to appreciate today the very important implication of the 
great distribution in the rationale of foodstuff safety. When the protocols are the result 
of coordinated action among several distributors, the rules are more in the register of 
relationships among companies by linking operations carried out in intermediated 
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markets to comply with a predetermined requirement. When it comes to individual 
initiatives, they contribute to a better differentiation with respect to competition and 
promote the market development (Fulponi et al., 2006). 
 
Figure 8 - Distribution of preferences for fruit and vegetable retail stores for consumers in the 
EU27.  
 
 Source: European Commission (2009). 
 
 These standards may include requirements in terms of infrastructure, equipment, 
forms of production and processes, risk management, etc., which are often more 
restrictive than Law (Hammoudi et al., 2009). Public or private standards not only 
influence in food safety but also they affect the company internal organization, their 
strategic plans, and even the own structure of the supply chain. Therefore, they affect 
the market power of players, the distribution of benefits along the channel and the 
stability of players. They also affect competition among companies, since the public 
policy success depends on the companies’ strategic response. They also act as entry 
barriers to the channel. 
 In the other hand, according to Giraud-Héraud et al. (2012), it is important to 
note that collective private standards are not developed with the intention of promoting 
the product or the characteristics of their processes that are communicate to consumers 
but of ensuring the compliance with the quality requirements imposed by the 
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regulations and avoiding negative liability and effects on the demand in case of health 
impact. The motivation to implement these standards it is not to lead to a differentiation 
in price but rather to protect the reputation and brands of retailers. So there are no 
differential prices or supplementary added values based to consumer labels. One such 
standard is only established if there is an enforceable regulated responsibility, so even if 
consumers respond in front of a crisis by causing a sharp collapsing demand, this may 
not be enough to bring the industry to implement preventive measures such as the 
aforementioned quality standards. In fact, these authors show that a more severe 
protocol does not necessarily lead to a reduced risk of incidence. The reason for this is 
that the risk of incidence depends not only on the requirement of the collective standard 
but also on the size of the coalition that develops and implements it, and there can be a 
negative correlation between the two variables. Whenever the cost in the event of an 
incidence is high enough, retailers will maximize their profits by adopting the minimum 
requirement in their collective standards to maintain a complete and stable coalition. 
 These coalitions, formed by companies, normalization groups and even social 
and NGOs have created private standards within global value chains related to food 
safety, food quality and environmental and social aspects of the agricultural production. 
The implementation of these standards is increasingly controlled by third-party 
certification. Private standards have made a very big influence on global agricultural 
food value chains, gradually introduced in national companies and international 
exchanges. These standards may relate to food safety and integrity of the risk control 
systems and sanitation, but they can also gaze on other aspects of food production as the 
source, environmental impact, animal welfare, etc. One of the essential characteristics 
of private standards, especially those related to food safety is the increased focus on 
production processes. In this regard, they apply increasingly in a greater extent, rules 
related to transformation processes in government regulations, as shown when resort, 
with increasing frequency, to the HACCP system in the Regulations, for example on 
food hygiene (Henson and Humphrey, 2009). 
 Making a summary description, we can understand that, parallel to the 
commercial success for retailers of their image and own brands, the risk exposure 
related to them has been increased. The retailer reaction has been to seek the system to 
transfer these risks along the channel to producers through quality systems. Within this 
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strategy it has become necessary that they support the third-party certification 
development (Henson and Northern, 1998). 
 
6.6. Strategies concerning exporting countries 
 
Table 7 - Summary of contributions on strategies related to food safety by exporting countries in 
the channel of the F&V.  
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Reardon, T., Codron 
J. M., Busch, L., 
Bingen, J., Harris, C. 
(1999) 
Developing 
countries 
Descriptive 
Effects of quality standards in developing 
countries and its corporate strategic 
responses. 
García Martinez, M., 
Poole, N. (2004) 
United 
Kingdom, 
France and 
Germany 
Empirical 
Study of the impact of increasing food 
safety requirements of European retailers 
and their effect as entry barrier for 
southern Meditarranean companies. 
Chen, M. X., Otsuki, 
T., Wilson, J. S. 
(2006) 
Developing 
countries 
Empirical 
Study of how compliance with foreign 
quality standards affects the development 
of export enterprises. 
Kalaitzis, P., Van 
Dik, G., Baourakis, 
G. (2007) 
UE Members 
and southern 
Mediterranean 
countries 
Descriptive 
Analysis of the trends driving the 
changes that are occurring in the supply 
chains of F&V and its effect on 
wholesalers and southern Mediterranean 
countries. 
Tozanli, S., El 
Hadad-Gauthier, F. 
(2010) 
UE Members 
and southern 
Mediterranean 
countries 
Descriptive 
Study of the impact of foreign trade 
policy on the coordination of local 
businesses. 
 
 Integrating into global markets implies a faster potential for growth and poverty 
reduction in the poorest countries. However, entry barriers to agricultural imports to 
markets of developed countries have made it difficult that these countries could take full 
advantage of this opportunity. García Martinez and Poole (2004) describe as the 
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fundamental structure and the guarantees required by the suppliers required by the 
European retail chains are one of the biggest entry barriers for the Mediterranean fresh 
product-exporting countries and, in general, for the developing ones. The long-term 
solution for these countries which are trying to achieve a continued demand for their 
products is based on structural, strategic and procedure initiatives to get the confidence 
of importers/retailers in the quality of their mechanisms to ensure the safety of their 
products. 
 Given this brake on export, Chen et al. (2006) they examine in detail how the 
fact of conforming to private quality standards of client countries affects the activity of 
exporting companies and how this adaptation is reflected in their propensity to continue 
exporting and market diversification. Specifically, their results indicate that technical 
regulations in industrialized countries inversely affect the exporting tendency of 
developing countries, and so they prove it empirically. In addition, the difference in 
standards among receptor countries causes diseconomies of scale and affects the 
decision making about whether to enter these markets or not. Further, they resolve that 
companies that subcontract components are more limited to comply with these 
protocols. 
 
Figure 9 - Confluence of requirements in the main manufacturing and marketing protocols.  
 
 
 
Source: Dzifa Mensah and Julien (2011). 
 
 This is due also to the fact that the role of standards has transformed from being 
a technical instrument for cost reduction in undifferentiated and homogeneous product 
markets, to be used as a competitive tool in differentiated product markets. The nature 
of the quality standards has moved from the characteristics of the products to the 
processes involved with them. In developing countries, these changes have tended to 
exclude small businesses and farms from participating in market growth, since they 
need to invest. The responses of the exporting companies in these countries in front of 
Management system
Adaptation programs BRC HACCP ISO 22000 SQF HACCP Holland IFS
HACCP
Validation and verification
Protocol for crisis management BRC ISO 22000
Quality management BRC SQF HACCP Holland IFS
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these changes go through new investments and they include: a) in the case of large 
companies and multinationals, to create their own standards, certifications, brands and 
labelling systems, b) for medium-scale domestic exporting companies, to create lobby 
organizations to governments for them to adopt similar standards for industrialized 
markets c) for small businesses and producers, to join together with public and non-
profit players to create certification systems that allow them to access to export markets 
and achieve am institutional change in the resulting non-tradable product markets 
(Reardon et al., 1999; Kalaitzis, et al., 2007). 
 
6.7. Incentives and investments to adopt quality standards 
 
Table 8 - Summary of contributions on incentives and investments of companies to adopt quality 
standards in the channel of F&V. 
AUTHOR (Date) 
Scope of the 
Study 
Type of 
the Study  
Specifications of the Study 
Holleran, E., 
Bredahl, M.E., 
Zaibet, L. (1999) 
General Descriptive 
Description of incentives to adopt quality 
systems by firms in order to ensure the 
food safety. 
Segerson, K. (1999) General Descriptive 
Study whether voluntary initiatives in 
food safety applied by the supply chain 
agents carry sufficient consumer 
protection 
Kalaitzis, P., Van 
Dik, G., Baourakis, 
G. (2007) 
 
UE Members 
and southern 
Mediterranean 
countries 
Descriptive 
Analysis of the trends driving the 
changes that are occurring in the supply 
chains of F&V and its effect on 
wholesalers and southern Mediterranean 
countries. 
 
 The competitiveness of food industry companies depends on their ability to 
adopt production processes adapted to the food safety and quality requirements. 
Ensuring quality supposes an added cost when carrying out transactions, being there the 
incentive to voluntarily adopt systems that optimize the management of that risk. While 
quality systems have the potential to reduce transaction costs by serving as guarantee to 
the seller, they may similarly serve to overcome market and trade barriers (Holleran et 
al., 1999). 
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 As described above, the critical importance of investing in systems to meet the 
standards required by destination markets (especially from the European Union) and to 
be part of the modern supply chains has led to southern Mediterranean countries to 
make an effort and reform their food control systems developing new legislation 
(Kalaitzis et al., 2007). 
 The food safety policy is currently based on a combination of voluntary 
measures applied by producers and regulatory measures imposed by the Administration. 
But, what is the equilibrium point of this combination? How to get to it? Segerson 
(1999) helps to resolve these issues by stating that in goods for which consumers can 
not easily detect issues related to health, market forces are unlikely to be sufficient to 
get adequate protection. In this context, however, the direct regulation of the 
Administration is not always necessary. The threat of the imposition of mandatory 
controls (possibly accompanied by financial incentives to undertake voluntary 
processes) can provide companies with sufficient reasons to invest in food safety with 
the intention of avoiding those controls. However, if companies do not respond 
adequately, regulators should be ready to continue their constraints and impose a 
regulatory system of protection. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 As part of the phenomenon of the increased international competition and the 
consequent adaptation of overall supply structures, they are facing new challenges in 
terms of quality and safety required /offered throughout the distribution channel. This 
commitment and guarantee relationship makes possible that collaboration and vertical 
coordination have taken a very important role that affects directly the established links. 
In particular, changes in the distribution channel of fresh products have had their 
greatest exponent in the creation, development and implementation of different private 
quality standards, that usually demand more requirements than legal rules, which in turn 
have become an entry barrier for companies located in developing countries and with an 
exporting tendency to markets where certifications of compliance with these standards 
are demanded by the rest of the distribution channel. 
 The prominence achieved by these protocols is equally based in the succession 
of health scares occurred in the consumer market in the last years. Furthermore, this 
importance is justified since they have been chosen by the channel members, mainly 
retailers or associations thereof, as the main tool to regain consumer confidence and 
increase their operating income. To do this, they seek the differentiation of their 
products compared to their competitors (which does not lead to a difference in price) 
providing information about products through, for example, their labelling. These 
players also benefit from the standards as a means to transfer the cost of the 
implementation of food safety systems and the risk because of their lack of compliance 
to the rest of the channel up to the producer, getting even to control what is being 
grown, where, how and by whom. 
 Consequently, the emergence, promotion and enhancement along the food safety 
supply chain have brought the need to manage it, and for this they develop techniques to 
optimize this relationship between the dimensions of the quality attributes, together with 
control systems, with the probability of detection of risk and danger of incidences. 
These techniques are materialized in integrated systems (audited by external certifiers) 
and based on the production, manufacturing and logistical processes to estimate health 
risk level in each commercial operation. 
 Simultaneously, facing a matter of public interest such as food safety, the 
different Administrations have taken an active part by generating new rules, both in an 
autonomous way and as if they were seeking the coordination and agreement with the 
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private sector through the co-regulation, self-regulation of the industry, exchange and 
spreading of information, etc. This has inevitably influenced the management strategies 
of health risk by companies, becoming dependent on their competitiveness of adopting 
production processes appropriate to the entire legislation and imposed protocols, since 
ensuring quality has a cost that is essential to manage and minimize. 
 In general, it has been observed that most of the literature on food safety focuses 
on aspects related to quality implementation and management, either generally, or by 
studying the implementation of specific protocols or standards. A large number of 
articles enumerates and describes the list of private standards that nowadays concur in 
different geographical areas. However, there are few which come to the food safety 
question from a practical market perspective or from the managers’ point of view of the 
distribution channel companies. Although this review shows research results on food 
safety related to strategic management decisions, such as communication with 
consumer, exports to developed country markets, adapting the regulatory framework, 
packaging or production, among others, other relevant areas within business strategy, as 
the related ones with companies’ financial aspects, vertically integrated operations or 
customer support, remain almost unexplored and they do not reach to reveal themselves 
as central study trends in food safety. Similarly, there are also few empirical studies that 
transmit to the business day to day, for their practical verification, the existing 
theoretical list on the question of food safety. 
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